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Abstract
We introduce a theoretical framework that contributes to the under-
standing of the non-communicable chronic diseases (NCDs) epidemics:
even if NCDs are not “biologically” communicable, they may spread
due to the transmission of unhealthy activities such as unhealthy diet,
physical inactivity, and smoking. In particular, we study the intergener-
ational dimension of this mechanism. We find that, due to the “social”
transmission of NCDs, agents choose lower health conditions and higher
unhealthy activities than what is socially optimal. Taxes on unhealthy
activities, that may subsidize health investments, can be used to restore
the social optimum. Finally, we also observe that our model is consis-
tent with the existence of regional asymmetries regarding the prevalence
of obesity and NCDs.
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1 Introduction
Non-communicable chronic diseases (NCDs) are “diseases or conditions (...)
that affect individuals over an extensive period of time and for which there are
no known causative agents that are transmitted from one affected individual
to another.” (Daar et al., 2007, p. 494). Despite being non-infectious NCDs
are considered an epidemic because of their high prevalence rates. Indeed,
according to Abegunde and Stanciole (2006), NCDs are increasing worldwide
accounting for over half of the total deaths in the world, and 87% in high in-
come countries. Moreover, the World Health Organization (WHO) points out
that, even if NCDs have been commonly associated with the elderly of wealthy
countries, at the present time NCDs are actually the major cause of death all
over the world, except for Sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, WHO (2008)
estimates 35 million deaths each year due to NCDs. Besides death, NCDs also
lead to substantial disabilitiy. Examples of NCDs are cardiovascular diseases,
i.e., mainly heart disease and stroke, cancers, respiratory diseases, diabetes,
and musculoskeletal disorders like osteoarthritis. In this paper, we provide an
economic modelling of NCDs’ epidemic mechanism enhancing its intergenera-
tional determinants. Our contribution is also in view of understanding NCDs’
economic implications and which policy instruments can be used to enhance
welfare. Additionally, we attempt to contribute to the analysis of cross-country
differences associated with the incidence of the epidemics of NCDs.
In general, epidemics have been widely studied from a medical perspective,
paying special attention to the mathematical modeling of the epidemics of
infectious diseases. A typical example in epidemiology is the well-known Com-
partmental Model (see for instance Kermack and McKendrick, 1927, 1932 and
1933; Bailey, 1975; Anderson and May, 1992; and Kuznetsov and Piccardi,
1994). However, there is a general agreement regarding the lack of explicit
epidemics’ economic modeling (Boucekkine et al., 2008 for a survey). Indeed,
even if the epidemics mechanism has already been modeled for infectious dis-
eases (Young, 2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006; and Philipson, 2000), to
our knowledge it has not yet been modeled for NCDs. Still, there are several
empirical studies that focus on the relationship between economics and the
prevalence of NCDs (see for instance Cumming, 1936; Lave and Seskin, 1971;
Cropper, 1981; Mitchell, 1990; and Suhrcke et al., 2006). In contrast, from a
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theoretical point of view, the economic mechanisms behind NCDs’ epidemics
are still far from being understood.
The literature on the epidemics’ economic modeling distinguishes between
short and long-lived epidemics. A short-lived epidemic takes place in a very
short period, after which the economy returns to its initial epidemiological en-
vironment. Therefore, short-lived epidemics are usually modeled as shocks on
the initial conditions of the economy. Examples are the Black Death (Herlihy,
1997; and Hansen and Prescott, 2002) and the Spanish Flu (Boucekkine et
al., 2008). On the other hand, long-lived epidemics are associated with long
periods of disease and hence their effects cannot be reduced to a story of initial
conditions shocks. As a result, the theory rationalizing this kind of epidemics
turns out to be more complex. An example is HIV (see for instance Young,
2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006; and Boucekkine et al., 2009). NCDs are
indeed another example of long-lived epidemics. However, because they are
non-infectious, the lack of knowledge about the dynamical mechanisms be-
hind NCDs epidemics and economics calls for further theoretical effort. Our
aim is precisely to contribute to the economic modeling of NCDs epidemics’
dynamical mechanism.
The main causes of NCDs are genetics and age, as well as modifiable risk
factors, such as unhealthy diet, physical inactivity, and smoking (WHO, 2005).
The novelty of our approach is to provide a theoretical framework that incor-
porates the social transmission of the modifiable risk factors. That is to say,
that even if NCDs are not infectious, we identify a transmission mechanism of
its modifiable risk factors that contributes to explaining the epidemic dimen-
sion of NCDs. More precisely, we introduce an intergenerational transmission
mechanism of the NCDs that being social is not biological.
We present an overlapping generations model in which agents live for three
periods (childhood, adulthood and old age), and where the dynamics of the
economy is based on health capital accumulation (Grossman, 1972). All eco-
nomic decisions are made at adulthood and therefore parents decide upon their
consumption levels and those of their children. More specifically, parents de-
cide upon consumption levels of unhealthy goods (as for example salt, tobacco,
saturated fat) and prevention ones (physical activity, medical care, etc.) that
affect the level of health capital of the following period. The intergenerational
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NCDs’ transmission is introduced through two different effects. The first as-
sumes that children inherit their parents’ health capital that is affected by
their parents’ choices of consumption of unhealthy and prevention goods. The
second assumes that a child’s probability of suffering from a NCD when old
depends on her parents’ health capital or, in other words, on her own health
capital at the first period of life, also affected by her parents’ choices. As-
suming that individuals are not perfectly altruist, an externality arises since
parents do not fully account for the effects of their choices on their children’s
health. Therefore the decentralized equilibrium is inferior to the social planner
solution. We then analyse how policy instruments such as a tax on the un-
healthy good, that may subsidize health investments, can be used to recover
the social optimum. Our model also captures the existence of different de-
velopment regimes linked to the presence of health thresholds. This provides
therefore a reasoning for different regional NCDs prevalence rates. Moreover,
we also study the role of health education or informational programs on the
level of health capital, NCDs prevalence rates, and how it affects the optimal
policy.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature that
provides evidence on NCDs social transmission in general and intergenerational
transmission in particular. In Section 3 we present the model. Section 4
considers the decentralized solution and, in Section 5, we provide the welfare
analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Evidence on NCDs’ social transmission
Our economic modeling of NCDs’ social transmission relies on three main
assumptions. First, the modifiable risk factors such as unhealthy diet, physical
inactivity, and smoking are socially transmissible. In particular, we assume
an intergenerational transmission mechanism consisting of parents deciding
upon their children’s consumption of unhealthy and prevention goods. Second,
parents’ choices affect their children’s health capital and, third, their children’s
probability of suffering from NCDs at old age. In this section we review the
literature that provides evidence on these assumptions.
The idea that modifiable risk factors are socially transmitted is not new.
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For instance, Eisenberg (2004) analyses the effect of a user-friend’s move or
graduation on a young person’s marijuana use, smoking, and binge drinking
and finds that all decrease. Family ties and in particular those between par-
ents and children are also very important in determining children’s propensity
in engaging in modifiable risk factors. Powell and Chaloupka (2005) find that
teenagers are more likely to smoke if their parents do, although genetics could
be playing a role. Overcoming the genetics determinant, Sacerdote (2007) uses
data on adoptees to investigate the intergenerational transmission of modifiable
risk factors on young adults offsprings and concludes that drinking behavior
is transmitted equally well towards adoptees and nonadoptees. Regarding un-
healthy eating and in particular disinhibited overeating, Francis et al. (2007)
find that girls with both parents overweight had the highest increases in disin-
hibited overeating and BMI. Other authors have investigated to what extent
mealtime environment and in particular parents’ feeding styles contribute to
the child’s unhealthy eating. In this respect, Zeller et al. (2007) have shown
that mothers of obese children experience more mealtime challenges and both
parents experience less mealtime interactions. Additionally, obese mothers are
more likely to offer their children food in response to emotional distress, use
food as a form of reward, encourage children to eat beyond what was wanted,
and control less high-fat foods intakes (Wardle et al., 2002). Still, there is
an ongoing discussion concerning income classes’ and race-related differences
(Powers et al., 2006), as well as sex-related ones (Jahnke and Warschburger,
2008). All in all and with few exceptions, the medical and economic literature
seems to agree on the intergenerational transmission of modifiable risk factors.
Evidence on parents’ choices affecting their children’s health capital is plen-
tiful. Even if health capital is a complex concept (Grossman, 1972 and 2000)
commonly used proxies are height (see, among others, Case and Paxson, 2008;
Deaton, 2008; Deaton and Arora 2009; Bozolli et al., 2008; and Steckel, 1995
and 2008; Silventoinen, 2003) and body mass index (BMI) (see, for instance,
Revicki and Israel, 1986; and WHO, 2004). Therefore, evidence on parents’
choices affecting their children’s height or BMI, as well as evidence on cor-
relation between parents’ and children’s heights or BMIs give support to our
assumption. In this regard, Chen and Li (2009) conclude that mother’s educa-
tion is an important determinant on a child’s health, as measured by height-
5
for-age-z-score. Additionally, the authors find the effect to be similar between
adoptees and own-birth children putting therefore in evidence that behavior,
just as genetics, is a channel of health transmission. Currie and Moretti (2003)
also find that mothers attending college had a significant impact on children’s
health but Lindeboom et al. (2009) do not find any evidence of increasing
the school leaving age of one year and offsprings’ health. The latter authors
remark that parents’ education affecting children’s health may be present only
at sufficiently high education levels. Concerning obesity, a prominent exam-
ple of parents’ choices affecting children’s health is tobacco consumption by
pregnant women. Indeed, despite causing low birth-weights, it contributes to
children’s obesity at several ages (see for example Adams et al., 2005; Lake
et al. 1997; Mamun et al., 2006; and Mendez et al., 2008). Moreover, there
is a common agreement that children of obese parents are more likely to be
obese at all ages, including adulthood (among others, Branca et al., 2007; and
Abu-Rmeileh et al., 2008). Part of obesity’s transmission is obviously due to
genetics. Still, in the last 30 years obesity has doubled in the US (Cutler et
al., 2003) and in many European countries it has increased threefold (WHO,
2009). Obviously such obesity prevalence increases cannot be supported by a
similar genetic change (Hill and Peters, 1998). Accordingly, Bouchard (1996)
estimates genetics to explain just between 25% and 40% of obesity rates in-
crease, in accordance with Sacerdote’s (2007) finding (46%).
Finally, there is evidence of parent’s choices affecting their children’s prob-
ability of suffering from NCDs at old age (see, for instance, Osmond and
Barker, 2000). Indeed, low birth weight is associated with increased proba-
bility of coronary heart diseases and diabetes in later life: the mechanism at
stake is that fetal growth restriction, due amongst others to maternal smoking
and unhealthy diet, may imply a reprograming of the metabolism. Barker and
Clark (1997) and Godfrey and Barker (2000) survey this literature, and Victo-
ria et al. (2008), Montgomery and Ekbom (2002), and Eriksson et al. (2001)
provide further results. Also. van den Berg et al. (2007) using historical data
for the Netherlands find evidence that early life exposure to the 1846-47 famine
results in lower survival rates at old ages for men.
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3 Setup
Let us assume a discrete-time infinity-horizon economy populated by overlap-
ping generations of agents living for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and
old age. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞, and all decisions are taken in the
adult period of life. We also consider identical agents within each generation
and no population growth (the size of each generation is normalized to 1). In
this paper we assume that individuals might suffer from a NCD at the old age,
and this will depend on their health capital.
Individual preferences are described by an expected lifetime utility function
Ut(ct, vt, ht+1, pit), where ∂Ut(·)/∂ct > 0, ∂Ut(·)/∂vt > 0, ∂Ut(·)/∂ht+1 > 0,
∂2Ut(·)/∂c2t < 0, ∂2Ut(·)/∂v2t < 0 , ∂2Ut(·)/∂h2t+1 < 0, limct→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂ct =
+∞, limvt→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂vt = +∞, and limht+1→0 ∂Ut(·)/∂ht+1 = +∞. Agents
care about consumption ct and unhealthy activities vt, which encompass mod-
ifiable risk factors such as smoking, alcohol, consumption of fattening food
and sugar-sweetened beverages. Moreover, following Grossman (1972, 2000),
they are also concerned about their health capital when old ht+1. We assume
that individuals may suffer from a NCD at old age with a probability pit. In
particular, as in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), we can consider the following
function in order to get closed-form solutions:
Ut(ct, vt, ht+1, pit) = µ ln ct +λ ln vt + (1− pit)γ lnht+1 + pitγ(1−φ) lnht+1, (1)
where µ > 0 and λ > 0 represent, respectively, the weight that agents give to
consumption and unhealthy activities, γ > 0 stands for their concern about
future health capital, and φ ∈ [0, 1] represents the disutility of suffering from
a NCD, which as a result of disease’s morbidity and time loss because of
treatment reduces utility driven from health capital.1
Consistently with the extensive medical literature on NCDs reviewed in
Section 2 we assume that the probability of suffering from a NCD is a func-
tion of the inherited health capital, or in other words, the health capital at
childhood (for an alternative economic modeling of early life conditions as de-
terminants of health and economic outcomes see de la Croix and Licandro,
1Notice that our setup also allows for two extreme cases: mortal disease (φ = 1), and
negligible morbidity (φ = 0).
7
2007). Therefore pit = pi(ht), such that ∂pi(ht)/∂ht < 0, limht→ 0 pi(ht) = piH
and limht→∞ pi(ht) = piL, with 0 < piL < piH < 1.
Adult agents allocate their exogenous income wt among consumption, un-
healthy activities, and health investments mt as medical care and physical
activity. The corresponding budget constraint is
wt = ct + vt +mt. (2)
As in Grossman (1972, 2000), our model assumes that health capital accu-
mulates over time. In particular, we consider the following law of motion:
ht+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αvt, (3)
where 0 < δ < 1 and σ, α > 0. In this expression, δ represents the depreciation
rate of health capital, σ is the effectiveness of health investment, and α is the
reduction of health conditions due to the unhealthy activities of individuals.
Consistently with Grossman (1972, 2000), we assume that δ is not affected
by illness. However, a disease induces utility loss through the parameter φ in
equation (1).2
Equation (3) considers that agents may affect their health capital at the
old age ht+1 through health investment and unhealthy activities. However
this also means that individual choices modify their children’s inherited health
capital as well. As a result the intergenerational transmission of NCDs occurs
through two different channels: A direct channel, since parents’ choices have a
direct impact on their children’s inherited health capital (ht+1), and an indirect
channel, since parents’ choices impact their children’s probability of developing
a NCD (pi(ht)).
3 Therefore, if individuals do not internalize these effects NCDs
will spread to future generations. Thus, we model NCDs’ epidemics based on
a intergenerational transmission mechanism related to modifiable risk factors,
2Notice that, in our model, ht+1 is the stock of health capital at the beginning of period
t+1, and the expected utility of health capital when old is thus given by (1− pit)γ lnht+1 +
pitγ(1 − φ) lnht+1. An alternative modeling of the effect of the disease could consider a
reduction of ht+1 in equation (3). However, this would imply that children also inherit the
disease, which is not appropriate for NCDs because they are non-communicable diseases by
definition.
3Evidence supporting these two assumptions has been reviewed in Section 2.
8
still acknowledging that NCDs are non-infectious diseases and, therefore, do
not exhibit “biological” transmission among individuals.4
Finally, we also consider that agents may have a limited perception of the
effect of the unhealthy choices on their own health and face a “perceived” law
of motion of health capital
hpt+1 = (1− δ)ht + σmt − αvt, (4)
where 0 <  < 1 represents agent’s health information level. This assump-
tion is consistent with evidence of poor nutritional knowledge not only of the
population in general (Vereecken and Maes, 2010; Grimes et al., 2009; and
Schwartz et al. 2005) but also of physicians (Flynn et al., 2003; and Makowske
and Feinman, 2005). Additionally, there is evidence that greater nutritional
knowledge is related to better nutrition (Kolodinsky et al., 2007; Pollard et al.
2010; and Vereecken and Maes, 2010). Still, when as is the case for NCDs the
health-risk has mainly long-term effects, limited perception of health effects
frequently arises (for a theoretical contribution see for instance Cremer et al.,
2010; and for empirical evidence see for example Davison et al., 1991; Frankel
et al., 1991; and Brownell et al., 2009; which relates sugar-sweetened beverages
and obesity).
4 Decentralized solution
Let us first study the decentralized solution. Individuals choose consumption,
unhealthy activities and health investments that maximize their utility subject
to their budget constraint and the “perceived” law of motion of health capital.
Knowing that, we can completely characterized the dynamics of the economy
by taking the “true” law of motion of health capital (3).
4.1 Individual behaviour
Agents maximize Ut(ct, vt, h
p
t+1, pit) subject to (2), (4), ct > 0, vt > 0, mt >
0 and ht > 0, where wt and ht are taken as given. For a general utility
4We have already pointed out in Section 2 that genetics is not the main factor explain-
ing the epidemics of NCDs (see for instance Hill and Peters, 1998; Bouchard, 1999; and
Sacerdote, 2007).
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function, the corresponding first order conditions (FOCs) are summarized in
the following expression:5
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
. (5)
Considering the functional form (1), the optimal choices are
mt =
σ[γ(σ + γ)(1− φpit) + λα]wt − (1− δ)[(λ+ µ)σ + µδ]ht
σ(σ + α)[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpit)] , (6)
vt =
λ[(1− δ)ht + σwt]
(σ + α)[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpit)] (7)
and
ct =
µ[(1− δ)ht + σwt]
σ[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpit)] . (8)
From (6)-(8) we can observe that, all other things being equal, income (wt) has
a positive effect on consumption, unhealthy activities and health investment.
Moreover, greater inherited health conditions (ht) will increase consumption
and unhealthy activities, but will decrease health investment: if inherited
health conditions improve, investment in health capital is less needed. Re-
garding the probability of suffering from a NCD, the greater the probability
the lower the value of old age for an individual. Therefore, pit has positive
effect on consumption and unhealthy activities, but a negative one on health
investment. Similarly, a greater disutility of NCD (φ) will reduce health in-
vestment, while consumption and unhealthy activities will rise. Finally, the
more informed is an agent regarding the negative effect of her unhealthy be-
havior () the higher the investment in health and the lower the consumption
of unhealthy goods.6
4.1.1 Dynamics
The dynamics of our economy are completely characterized by the evolution
of health capital, as given by the “true” law of motion. By substituting (6)-(8)
5Since agents inherit their current health conditions, our results would not change if ht
is also introduced in the utility function.
6Notice that, due to the assumption of additive separable preferences (1),  has not a
direct effect on ct. However, as we will see in Section 4.1.1,  affects ct along both the short
and long-run equilibrium.
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into (3), we get the corresponding transition function:
ht+1 =
[γ(σ + α)(1− φpi(ht))− (1− )λα][(1− δ)ht + σw]
(σ + α)[λ+ µ+ γ(1− φpi(ht))] ≡ ϕ(ht), (9)
where income is assumed to be constant (wt = w) for the sake of simplicity.
Since we are interested in positive interior solutions, Proposition 1 establishes
sufficient condition for ϕ(ht) > 0.
Proposition 1 If NCDs’ morbidity is high enough (φ > φ˜, where φ˜ = 1 −
λα/γσ) agents should be sufficiently informed about the effect of the unhealthy
activities ( > ˜, where ˜ = λα−(1−φ)γσ
λα+(1−φ)γα) and be sufficiently concerned about
their future health conditions (γ > λα/σ) to ensure positive health capital at
old age (ϕ(ht) > 0). Otherwise, (φ < φ˜), health capital at old age is always
positive (ϕ(ht) > 0).
Proof. From Equation (9) we find that ϕ(ht) > 0 ⇔ pit < p˜i, where p˜i =
1
φ
[1 − (1−)λα
γ(σ+α)
]. We consider all possible probabilities of disease (0 < pit < 1)
and therefore restrict ourselves to the case p˜i > 1. Consequently, p˜i > 1 ⇒
ϕ(ht) > 0. This sufficient condition can be rewritten as  > ˜, where ˜ is
defined as in the proposition. Since  is assumed to be strictly positive, it is
easy to see from the definition of ˜ that the condition λα−(1−φ)γσ < 0 implies
˜ < 0 ⇒  > ˜ ⇔ p˜i > 1 ⇒ ϕ(ht) > 0. Note also that λα − (1 − φ)γσ < 0 ⇔
φ < φ˜, where φ˜ is defined as in the proposition. Hence, if λα− (1− φ)γσ < 0,
φ < φ˜ is a sufficient condition for ϕ(ht) > 0. Otherwise, if λα− (1− φ)γσ > 0
(⇔ φ > φ˜) the sufficient condition becomes  > ˜ (notice that γ > λα/σ is
needed to well define φ˜)
Proposition 1 ensures positive health capital when NCDs’ morbidity is high
enough. In this case individuals should be sufficiently informed about un-
healthy activities health effects and be concerned about their future health
conditions.
In this paper we focus on the steady-state equilibrium h∗, which is defined
as a fixed point of the transition function, i.e., h∗ = ϕ(h∗).7 One can easily
verify that h∗ is stable (unstable) iff ϕ′(h∗) < 1(> 1). As in Azariadis (1996),
7Mathematically, this corresponds to a stationary point of the equilibrium difference
equation (9).
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and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), we can assume the following step function
for the probability of disease in order to get further analytical results:
pi(ht) =
{
piH if ht < h
c
piL if ht ≥ hc,
(10)
where hc is an exogenous health threshold. According to this functional form,
if the health conditions of an individual are low (high) enough (hc) the prob-
ability of suffering from a NCD will be high (low). The existence of health
thresholds is well established in the medical literature. Indeed physicians make
often use of thresholds to identify diseases and critical health conditions (see,
for instance, Yuill and Miller, 2008: “cirrhosis in the liver may not result in a
clinical effect until over 50% of the liver has been replaced by fibrous tissue”).
Other well known examples are the thresholds for diabetes, blood pressure,
obesity (BMI), etc.
Taking (10), the corresponding transition function is therefore composed
by two branches given by
ϕ(ht) =

[γ(σ+α)(1−φpiH)−(1−)λα][(1−δ)ht+σw]
(σ+α)[λ+µ+γ(1−φpiH)] ≡ ϕpiH (ht) if ht < hc
[γ(σ+α)(1−φpiL)−(1−)λα][(1−δ)ht+σw]
(σ+α)[λ+µ+γ(1−φpiL)] ≡ ϕpiL(ht) if ht ≥ hc.
(11)
In this case, we can prove that the dynamics of the model admits two stable
steady-states:
Proposition 2 Assuming the functional form (10) and the conditions stab-
lished in Proposition 1, there exist two stable steady-states 0 < h∗piH < h
c < h∗piL,
given by
h∗pii =
[σψpii − (1− )λα]w
γδψpii + σ(λ+ µ) + α[λ(1− δ) + (µ+ λδ)]
,
where ψpii = γ(σ+α)(1−φpii) and i = {H,L}. (If instead 0 < h∗piH < h∗piL < hc,
the only steady-state is h∗piH . Finally, if 0 < h
c < h∗piH < h
∗
piL
the only steady-
state is h∗piL).
Proof. It is easy to see that 0 < ∂ϕ(ht)/∂ht < 1 for all ht > 0, under the same
conditions of Proposition 1. Therefore, assuming the step function (10), there
exist two stable steady-states h∗pii for i = {H,L} if h∗piH < hc < h∗piL (notice
that h∗piH < h
∗
piL
since ∂ϕ(ht)/∂pit < 0). The closed-forms of the steady-state
values are provided by computing the fixed points of the transition function
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(11). Additionally one can easily check that if the health capital threshold is
high enough so that 0 < h∗piH < h
∗
piL
< hc, the economy admits only a steady-
state given by h∗piH . Otherwise, if the health capital threshold is low enough
0 < hc < h∗piH < h
∗
piL
the only steady-state is h∗piL
Since ϕpii(ht) is monotonically increasing in ht, we can see that h
∗
pii
is pos-
itively affected by the income (w), the effectiveness of health investment (σ),
the individual concern about future health capital (γ), and agent’s health in-
formation level (). However, a greater disability of NCDs (φ) will reduce the
steady-state value of health capital.8
Figure 1: Dynamics
Figure 1 represents the two possible steady-states, assuming 0 < h∗piH <
hc < h∗piL . The high (low) steady-state is associated with a high (low) level of
health capital and a low (high) probability of suffering from a NCD. Indeed,
if the initial health conditions are high (low) enough (h0 > (<)h
c), the prob-
ability of being struck by a NCD is low (high). Therefore, agents will give a
higher (lower) value to their old age. Consequently, this will induce a higher
(lower) investment in health and lower (higher) consumption and unhealthy
activities, and the economy will end up in the high (low) steady-state.
8Notice that if ϕ(ht) is concave and monotonically increasing in ht, there is a unique
stable steady-state h∗. In this case, we can also conclude from Equation (9) that h∗ is
positively affected by w, σ, γ, and . Moreover, the steady-state value is negatively affected
by φ too.
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Finally, we can point out that multiple steady states may support the exis-
tence of regional asymmetries in what concerns obesity and NCDs in general.
Even restricting ourselves to Europe, we can identify meaningful differences
among countries. In 2005 in France, for example, 8% of men and 7% of women
are obese, contrasting enormously with 21% of men and 24% of obese women
in the United Kingdom (WHO, 2009). Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) have
also found evidence of country asymmetries with respect to hypertension.
5 Welfare implications of NCDs
In this section we show that a major consequence of the social transmission
mechanism of NCDs is that individual choices are socially non-optimal. We
calculate the social optimum and compare it with the decentralized solution
characterized in the previous section. In addition to this analysis, Section
5.2 considers the golden rule defined by Chichilnisky et al. (1995). This
allocation may be considered as a constrained social optimum in which the
planner maximizes the aggregate surplus at the steady state, ignoring thus the
transition process. It has the advantage of allowing us to provide further
analytical results. Finally, in Section 5.3, we consider the implications of
relaxing the assumption that individuals cannot affect their own probability
of disease, i.e., we assume pi(ht+1) instead of pi(ht).
5.1 Full-fledge forward-looking planner
We characterize the social optimum by means of considering a full-fledge
forward-looking planner, which maximizes a social welfare function β−1U−1 +∑∞
t=0 β
tUt (ct, vt, ht+1, pit) subject to (2), (3), ct > 0, vt > 0, mt > 0 and ht > 0,
where w and h0 are taken as given, and β ∈ (0, 1) represents the inter-temporal
discount rate. The corresponding Lagrangian is
L = β−1U−1 +
∞∑
t=0
βt [Ut (ct, vt, ht+1, pit) + ιt+1Ωt] , (12)
where Ωt = (1 − δ)ht + σw − (σ + α)vt − σct − ht+1 and ιt+1 > 0 is the
Lagrangian multiplier (shadow price of health capital). The corresponding
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FOCs are summarized in
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
{
∂Ut
∂ht+1
+ β
[
∂Ut+1
∂pit+1
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
+ ιt+2(1− δ)
]}
. (13)
Comparing this expression with the FOC of the decentralized economy (5),
we can conclude that the individual choices are socially non-optimal. Indeed,
for ct and ht+1 = h
p
t+1 given, agents choose too much unhealthy activities than
what is socially optimal (notice that ∂2Ut(·)/∂v2t < 0). Our model points
out two sources of inefficiency. First, there is an intergenerational externality
due to the social transmission of NCDs. Agents do not consider the direct
effect of their individual choices on future health conditions, βιt+2(1 − δ).
Moreover, they do not account for the indirect effect of their individual be-
haviour on the future generation through the probability of suffering from a
NCD, β ∂Ut+1
∂pit+1
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
. Finally, a limited perception of the consequences of their
unhealthy consumption () will introduce an additional inefficiency. In fact,
only if, simultaneously, there is no (social) transmission of NCDs (δ → 1 and
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
= 0) and agents have a high level of health information ( → 1), (5)
and (13) coincide and the decentralized solution is thus socially optimal. Still,
notice that the social transmission of NCDs generates inefficiency even under
the case of low misperception (→ 1).
The previous result raises the question of how to implement the social op-
timum. In this paper we study the case of a tax on unhealthy activities. Real
world examples encompass tobacco and alcohol taxation and the so called fat
tax. A fat tax is a surcharge placed upon fattening foods and sugar-sweetened
beverages with the aim of discouraging their consumption. Indeed the con-
sumption of these products is considered a NCD modifiable risk factor since it
contributes to an unhealthy diet and their increased consumption is associated
with obesity epidemics (see for instance Vartanian et al., 2007; and Ludwig
et al., 2001). Currently, fat taxes are under debate in several countries. In
2009, 33 states in the USA taxed soft drinks (Brownell et al., 2009). More-
over, France is considering plans to impose a fat tax on junk food (see IGF,
2008; Bonnet et al., 2009; and Allais et al., 2010). Non surprisedly, part of
the food and beverage industry strongly criticizes this policy due to sales re-
duction (see, for instance, Brownell et al., 2009; and Vartanian et al., 2007).
One of their main arguments considers that fat taxes are against individual
freedom: contrary to tobacco and alcohol, the consumption of fattening food
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and soft drinks does not involve negative externalities as second hand smoke
and drunk driving accidents (Rudd, 2009). Nevertheless, authors as Brownell
et al. (2009) and Finkelstein et al. (2009) have identified external effects due
to the rise of obesity-related medical expenditures. In this regard, our paper
contributes to this literature by pointing out another external effect (an inter-
generational externality) related to the social transmission of NCDs that may
justify the usage of this kind of taxes. However, several drawbacks of fat taxes
have been already identified in the litterature. A commonly-raised problem is
the regressive nature of the policy (Allais et al., 2010). Nevertheless, several
authors (see for instance, Brownell et al., 2009; Jacobson and Brownell, 2000;
and Rudd, 2009) point out that such a problem is minimized if the revenues
of the fat taxes are used in the benefit of the poor. In this direction, despite
that redistribution concerns are beyond the scope of our paper (for an ana-
lytical dynamic setup of income distribution under epidemics, see Boucekkine
and Laffargue, 2010), we model fat taxes where the corresponding revenues
are used to finance healthy activities.
Let us consider the decentralized problem with a tax (τt) on unhealthy ac-
tivities. We use the corresponding tax revenues to subsidize (st) the healthy
activities (see for instance Cremer et al., 2010, for another theoretical contribu-
tion). Individuals maximize Ut(ct, vt, h
p
t+1, pit) subject to (4) and the modified
budget constraint
w = ct + (1− st)mt + (1 + τt)vt, (14)
taking st and τt as given. Finally, at the equilibrium, stmt = τtvt for all t ≥ 0.
The corresponding FOC is
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+
(
σ
τt
1− st + α
)
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
, (15)
Since at the social optimum ht+1 = h
p
t+1, we get the trajectory for the optimal
policy by equating (13) and (15):
τt
1− st =
α
σ
{
(1− ) + β
[
∂Ut+1
∂pit+1
∂pit+1
∂ht+1
+ (1− δ)ιt+2
∂Ut
∂ht+1
]}
. (16)
As it is clear from the previous expression, this optimal policy considers the two
sources of inefficiency described before, i.e., the intergenerational externality
(direct and indirect effects) and the limited perception of the agents. Indeed,
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as one can expect, in absence of transmission mechanism (δ → 1 and ∂pit+1
∂ht+1
= 0)
and misperception (→ 1) the optimal tax and subsidy vanish.9
5.2 Golden rule
Let us now consider the golden rule allocation defined in Chichilnisky et al.
(1995). As in John and Peccenino (1994), this case may be interpreted as a
particular social planner problem where we maximize the aggregate utility at
the steady-state. The main advantage of this solution is that it allows us to
provide further analytical results regarding social welfare.
The social planner maximizes U (c, v, h, pi) subject to (2) and (3) at the
steady-state, c > 0, v > 0, m > 0 and h > 0. The corresponding FOC is
provided by
∂U
∂v
=
∂U
∂c
+
α
δ
(
∂U
∂h
+
∂U
∂pi
∂pi
∂h
)
. (17)
Similar to the case of full-fledge forward-looking planner, the FOC of the de-
centralized economy (5), at the steady-state, does not coincide with equation
(17) because of the intergeneration transmission of NCDs and the mispercep-
tion problem. As before, we can implement the golden rule by means of a tax
(τ) on the unhealthy consumption and a subsidy (s) on the healthy activities.
Taking ht+1 = h
p
t+1, we get the corresponding policy by equating (15) at the
steady state with (17):
τ
1− s =
α
σ
[(
1
δ
− 
)
+
1
δ
∂U
∂pi
∂pi
∂h
∂U
∂h
]
. (18)
As it is clear from (17) and (18), under a high level of health information
( → 1) and no intergenerational transmission (δ → 1 and ∂pi
∂h
= 0) both
FOCs coincide and, therefore, tax and subsidy become zero (notice that, at
the equilibrium, sm = τv).
9Notice that the optimal solution can be also decentralized by means of a tax on unhealthy
activities and a lump-sum transfer Tt of the corresponding tax revenues to the agents (i.e.,
the modified budget constraint would be w+Tt = ct+mt+(1+τt)vt and, at the equilibrium,
Tt = τtvt). In our model, this case is equivalent to consider st = 0.
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5.2.1 Golden rule in our setting
Let us consider the functional forms (1) and (10). Taking (2) and (3) at the
steady-state, and the equation (17), the golden rule values for health capital
and unhealthy activities are respectively:
hgpii =
γσ(1− φpii)w
δ[(λ+ µ) + γ(1− φpii)] (19)
and
vgpii =
λσw
(σ + α)[(λ+ µ) + γ(1− φpii)] , (20)
for i = {H,L}.10 As it is clear from Proposition 2, the individual choices are
different than the golden rule allocation. Indeed, we can claim that due to the
transmission mechanism of NCDs and the misperception problem agents will
choose too many unhealthy activities and too little health capital:
Proposition 3 At the steady-state, under Proposition 2, individuals choose
higher quantity of unhealthy activities and lower health capital than the golden
rule allocation.
Proof. Taking (7) at the steady state and (20), it is easy to see that v∗pii > v
g
pii
since  < 1 and, from Proposition 2, h∗pii > 0, for i = {H,L}. Let us now
prove that h∗pii < h
g
pii
, for i = {H,L}. To do that it is sufficient to prove that
ϕpii(ht) < ϕ
g
pii
(ht), for all ht > 0, where ϕ
g
pii
(ht) = (1 − δ)ht + σmgpii − αvgpii
(the corresponding pii-branch for the golden rule problem). From (2) and (3)
in the golden rule problem, it is easy to get mgpii =
[λα+γ(σ+α)(1−φpii)]w
(σ+α)[(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii)] > 0.
Therefore, taking (20), ϕgpii(ht) =
[(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii)](1−δ)ht+γσ(1−φpii)w
(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii) . Rearranging
terms in (11) we get ϕpii(ht) =
[γ(1−φpii)−( 1−σ+α )λα][(1−δ)ht+σw]
(λ+µ)+γ(1−φpii) . Finally, by com-
paring these two expressions, it is easy to conclude that ϕpii(ht) < ϕ
g
pii
(ht), for
all ht > 0
Furthermore, from equation (2), we can also conclude that agents choose
too much consumption (c∗pii > c
g
pii
) and too little health investment (m∗pii <
10Without lost of generality, this paper focuses on the case of a golden rule allocation
associated to each steady-state established in Proposition 2. As it is clear from Figure 1,
multiplicity arises if hgpiH < h
c < hgpiL (notice that h
g
piH < h
g
piL since ∂h
g
pii/∂pii < 0). However,
if hc < hgpiH , the golden rule allocation is unique and given by h
g = hgpiL . In this case, it is
easy to see that the results provided in this section remain the same.
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mgpii) at the steady-state. From (18) and assuming the step function (10), the
corresponding policy to implement the golden rule is now given by
τpii
1− spii
=
α
σ
(
1
δ
− 
)
. (21)
Moreover, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4 In our setting, the golden rule allocation can be decentralized
by means of a tax τpii on the unhealthy consumption, and a subsidy spii on the
healthy activities, which is financed by the τpii revenues. The corresponding
closed forms are given by
τpii =
τ˜
1 +
vgpii
mgpii
τ˜
(22)
and
spii = τpii
vgpii
mgpii
, (23)
where τ˜ = α
σ
(
1
δ
− ) and vgpii
mgpii
= λσ
λα+γ(1−φpii)(σ+α) .
Proof. From (21) we know that
τpii
1−spii
decentralizes the golden rule allocation.
Since spiim
g
pii
= τpiiv
g
pii
, we get (22) and (23). Finally, from (20) and the formula
of mgpii (see the proof of Proposition 3) we obtain the expression for
vgpii
mgpii
Finally, from this proposition we can also conclude that the greater the
misperception problem (i.e, the lower ) the greater should be the tax and the
subsidy. This result points out the importance of considering agent’s health
information level to study the economic impact of this kind of policies. In this
regard, Allais et al. (2010) have predicted little effect of fat taxes on French
consumers. However, they also recognise that their study does not include the
effect of informational programs. Indeed, Pollard et al. (2009) concluded about
the substantial effectiveness of the “Go for 2&5” (2 fruits and 5 vegetables a
day) campaign in Australia. Moreover, Bonnet et. al (2009), using the same
data base as Allais et al. (2010), showed that the estimated price elasticities of
individual consumption are significant and may justify a tax on high density
and cheap energy categories of food such as junk food as effective policy to
reduce obesity and overweight.11 For further empirical results in the same
direction see, for instance, Mytton et al. (2007) and Epstein et al. (2007).
11Among other things, they found that a 10% increase of junk food prices together with a
10% reduction of fruits and vegetables prices would induce a reduction of the proportion of
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5.3 Further analytical results
As we have observed in Section 1, our set-up considers pit = pi(ht). Still, it
may be reasonably argued that individuals also affect their own probability of
disease. For this reason, let us now study the case pit = pi(ht+1): agents may
modify their own probability of suffering from a NCD, which is determined just
before arriving to the old-age. The FOC corresponding to the decentralized
solution is given by
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
(
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
+
∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂hpt+1
)
. (24)
Comparing this expression with (5), one can observe that agents consider the
effect of the individual choices on the probability of suffering from a NCD
because they can modify their own pit. Let us now study the social optimum.
The FOC corresponding to the full-fledge social planner is given by
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+ α
[
∂Ut
∂ht+1
+
∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂ht+1
+ βξt+2(1− δ)
]
, (25)
where ξt+2 > 0 is the corresponding Lagrangian multiplier. From (24) and
(25), taking ht+1 = h
p
t+1, it is easy to see that part of the effect of the social
transmission of NCDs is internalized. Indeed, the indirect effect of the individ-
ual behaviour on the probability of suffering from a NCD partially vanishes if
agents can modify pit. However, agents completely neglect the direct effect on
the future generations, βξt+2(1 − δ). Moreover, as before, the misperception
problem () adds an additional source of inefficiency.
Similar to the previous case, we can decentralized the social planner solu-
tion by means of a tax (τt) on the unhealthy activities, that we use to subsidize
(st) the healthy activities. The individuals’ FOC is now given by
∂Ut
∂vt
=
∂Ut
∂ct
+
(
σ
τt
1− st + α
)(
∂Ut
∂hpt+1
+
∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂hpt+1
)
, (26)
and, taking ht+1 = h
p
t+1, the optimal policy is provided by equating (25) and
(26):
τt
1− st =
α
σ
[
(1− ) + β(1− δ)
(
ξt+2
∂Ut
∂ht+1
+ ∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂ht+1
)]
. (27)
overweight (children: -33:64%; adult males: -8.78%; and adult females: -11.65%) and obese
(children: -30.88%; adult males: -11.13%; and adult females: -20.61%).
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Let us compare this expression with Equation (16). In the case of pit = pi(ht),
the optimal policy includes, in addition to the misperception problem, both
the direct and indirect effect of the individual choices on future generations’
health. However, if agents can modify their own probability of suffering from
a NCD, we only need to correct the direct effect and . Moreover, from (27)
it is clear that ∂Ut
∂pit
∂pit
∂ht+1
allows us to reduce the optimal policy (for instance,
a lower fat tax in the case of a lump-sum transfer). Finally, under a high
level of health information ( → 1), (24) and (25) coincide under absence of
transmission mechanism of NCDs (δ → 1). Therefore, the corresponding tax
and subsidy vanish.12
6 Concluding remarks
We have developed a model that rationalizes the “social” transmission mech-
anism behind NCDs’ epidemics: the transmission of modifiable risk factors
results in a intergenerational externality. Such externality arises through two
different effects: a direct effect because parents affect the inherited health cap-
ital of their children, and an indirect effect because they affect the probability
of their children suffering from a chronic disease when old. Parents are not
fully altruistic and when they make their choices they do not entirely account
for the impact of their choices on their children’s health. Consequently, the
negative externality results in a lower health capital level and a higher level of
unhealthy activities at the descentralized equilibrium, which contrasted to the
optimal choice. Taxes on unhealthy activities, where the corresponding rev-
enues are used to subsidized health investments (Cremer et al., 2010), can be
used to restore socially optimal health capital and unhealthy activities’ levels.
Only when the two effects are neutralized is the externality absent. Still, even
in the absence of externality there is room for public intervention if individuals
12Notice that, when pit = pi(ht), we have assumed a step function (10) in order to provide
closed-form solutions (see sections 4.1.1 and 5.2.1). Indeed, this functional form may be
considered as a discretized version of a convex-concave pi(ht) (in Figure 1, the convex-concave
broken line corresponds to a convex-concave ψ(ht)). However, a step-simplification is not
possible if pit = pi(ht+1): the function must be differentiable in its whole domain. In this
case, we may directly consider a convex-concave function like pi(ht) = (piL−piH) h
2
t+1
1+h2t+1
+piH .
Nevertheless, the analysis would be restricted to implicit functions and numerical results.
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are not well informed about unhealthy activities health effects. Finally, we also
show that our model is consistent with the existence of international/regional
asymmetries regarding the prevalence of obesity and NCDs.
Several remarks can be made with regard to our modelization. Since our
paper focuses on the intergenerational transmission of NCDs, we have con-
sidered a simple set-up that incorporates a social transmission mechanism of
the disease. However, we could extend our framework by adding other effects
behind epidemics. Among them, would be an endogenous income effect. In-
deed, Boucekkine et al. (2009) have already studied the interaction between
epidemics and income within the context of communicable diseases such as
HIV/AIDS and malaria. In particular, they empirically found a significant
effect of this kind of epidemics on educational choices and wages. Following
de la Croix and Doepke (2003), one could endogenize income in our set-up as
being a function of human capital w(h˜t): NCDs would affect income through
agent’s educational choices. Finally, another simplification of our framework is
the absence of savings: since in our model health is already an inter-temporal
choice variable we did not include physical capital (savings) for simplicity.
Therefore, one could incorporate savings as a technical extension of our paper.
In this regard the approach introduced by Mariani et al. (2010) might provide
a fruitful possibility.
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